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INTRODUCTION
Emerging digital technologies (EDTs),1 (e.g. Internet of Things and of
Services (IoT/IoS),2 Artificial Intelligence (AI),3 advanced robotics,4 and
autonomous vehicles (AV)5) can lead to fundamental discoveries, opening up
new possibilities, and significantly improving the lives of many, particularly, by
bringing major benefits to our society and economy through better healthcare,
more efficient public administration, stronger democratic processes, safer
transport, a more competitive industry, and sustainable farming. Machinelearning,6 for example, can be used to make more accurate and faster medical
diagnoses and surgeries,7 carry out dangerous and repetitive tasks, and free up
valuable time. The Internet of Bodies, that is, the merger of IoT and AI with the

1 The category of emerging digital technologies is not fully defined and exhaustively identified in
European documents on the topic, where they are indicated with the exemplificative list of “Internet
of Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence, advanced robotics and autonomous systems”. In this work, the
wording of the EU institutions is adopted.
2 IoT is “a global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by
interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information
and communication technologies.” (Recommendation ITU-T Y.2060, June 2012,
https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=y.2060, p. 1). An overview of the IoT as
“the next major economic and societal innovation wave enabled by the Internet.”, together with an
account of technologies and phenomena like personal wearables, smart homes, smart cities, smart
manufacturing, smart energy, smart farming, and circular economy, are provided in Staff Working
Document, Advancing the Internet of Things in Europe, 19.4.2016, SWD(2016) 110 final, http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016SC0110, accompanying the Communication of
the European Commission, Digitising European Industry - Reaping the full benefits of a Digital Single
Market,
COM
(2016)
180,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0180&from=EN.
3 According to the definition endorsed at European level, “[a]rtificial intelligence (AI) refers to systems
that display intelligent behavior by analyzing their environment and taking actions – with some degree
of autonomy – to achieve specific goals. AI-based systems can be purely software-based, acting in the
virtual world (e.g. voice assistants, image analysis software, search engines, speech and face
recognition systems) or AI can be embedded in hardware devices (e.g. advanced robots, autonomous
cars, drones or Internet of Things applications).” High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence,
A definition of AI: Main capabilities and scientific disciplines 1
(2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=56341.
4 Robotics is interestingly defined as “AI in action in the physical world.”
Not surprisingly, it is also
referred to as embodied AI.”
For an overview of relevant initiatives of the European Union, see
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/robotics.
5 An account of the initiatives of the European Union in relation to Connected and Automated Mobility
(CAM) is available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/connected-and-automatedmobility-europe. See also Katie Atkinson, Autonomous Cars: A Driving Force for Change in Motor
Liability and Insurance, 17 SCRIPTED A J. L., TECH. & SOC’Y 125 (2020);
Francesco
Paolo
Patti, The European Road to Autonomous Vehicles, 43 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.125 (2019).
6 Machine learning – either supervised, unsupervised or reinforcement learning – is only one of the
several learning techniques used to train AI, along with, for instance, neural networks, deep learning,
and decision trees. The goal is to engineer a general intelligence characterized by autonomy, selfreflection, self-improvement, and commonsense, in the ambitious attempt to replicate, or even outdo,
human intelligence. See
PETER VOSS , ARTIFICIAL GENERAL INTELLIGENCE (Springer 2007).
7 For instance, neurodegenerative disorders, such as Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s disease, could be
diagnosed on the basis of mouse flickers registered by an AI application. Ryan W. White, P. Murali
Doraiswamy, E ric Horvitz, Detecting Neurodegenerative Disorders from Web Search Signals, NPJ
DIGITAL MED. 1
(2018),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41746-018-0016-6). Characteristics
and issues of healthcare AI applications are analyzed in Drew
Simshaw, Nicolas
Terry, Kris
Hauser, M.L. Cummings, Regulating Healthcare Robots: Maximizing Opportunities While Minimizing
Risks, 22
RICH.
J. L. & TECH
1 (2016).
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human body, can allow athletes to track their performance with a watch, truck
companies to check the alertness of their drivers, and patients to be reminded if
they forgot to ingest their medication on the basis of a sensor implanted in their
stomach.8 In more general terms, such technologies have the potential to
transform products, services, activities, procedures, and practices in several
economic sectors and in relation to many aspects of society, promising increased
productivity and efficiency gains. At the same time, EDTs can even play a key
role with regard to climate and environmental-related challenges, as enablers for
advancing the 2030 Agenda and attaining the Sustainable Development Goals
of the Green Deal.9 Moreover, quantum computing is expected to be a gamechanger, thus leading EDTs beyond anything currently envisaged.10
However, as smart machines develop in a way that makes them pursue their
tasks with diverse degrees of autonomy,11 their new and enhanced potential
brings in risks – or increase the existing ones – for both those who offer them
and those who use them. Indeed, such technologies may have unintended effects
or be used for malicious purposes. The list of new possible “algorithmic
damages” is as long and various as the list of new ways to inflict old harms.
Algorithms trained with biased data may lead to biased decisions to the
detriment of minorities when screening job candidates, assessing
creditworthiness for loans, or predicting criminal behaviour.12 Not surprisingly,
even a chatbot may turn out to be racist13. Autocomplete functions of search
engines may cause defamation, reputational damage, or trademark violations.14
Robo-advisors may lead to wrong investments,15 while errors in automated
diagnoses and surgeries may ruin a person's life. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities
in smartwatches for children may be exploited to obtain access to the child,16
while a flaw in the radio of a vehicle could expose the risk of unauthorised access
by a third party maliciously intending to take over the control system of the self-

8 Andrea M.
Matwyshyn, The Internet of Bodies, 61(1) WM. & MARY L. REV.
77 (2019).
9 Communication of the European Commission, The European Green Deal, COM (2019) 640 final (Dec.
11,
2019),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0640&from=EN. For an overview of Sustainable
Development Goals, see resources available at
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/sdi and
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/SDGs/index_en.htm.
10 Commission Staff Working Document, Quantum Technologies, 19.4.16, SWD(2016) 107,
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=15270, accompanying the Communication
of the European Commission Parliament the Council, the Europe Economic and Social Committee of
the Regions, European Cloud Initiative - Building a competitive data and knowledge economy in
Europe,
COM
(2016)
178
final
(Apr.
19,
2016)
,
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=15266.
11 On the concept of autonomy, see infra para 2.
12 James Manyika, Jake Silberg, and Brittany Presten, What Do We Do About the Biases in AI?, HARV.
BUS. REV. (2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/what-do-we-do-about-the-biases-in-ai.
13 This occurred with Tay, the chatbot developed by Microsoft to self-learn conversational skills and
autonomously interact with users via Twitter. It was shut down in 2016. Sarah Perez, Microsoft silences
its new A.I. bot Tay, after Twitter users teach it racism, TECHCRUNCH (2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/24/microsoft-silences-its-new-a-i-bot-tay-after-twitter-users-teach-itracism/.
14 Stavroula Karapapa, Maurizio Borghi, Search Engine Liability for Autocomplete Suggestions:
Personality, Privacy and the Power of the Algorithm, 23(3) INT’L J. L. AND INFO. TECH. 261 (2015).
15 Dominic Litz, Risk, Reward, Robo-Advisers: Are Automated Investment Platforms Acting in Your Best
Interest, 18(2) J. HIGH T. L. 367 (2018).
16 On a similar case, see the RAPEX notification from Iceland published in the EU Safety Gate’s website
(A12/0157/19).
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driving car. In fact, although autonomous vehicles promise a reduction of
accidents caused by human errors, flaws in object recognition technologies
embedded in self-driving cars could still cause accidents, and thus injuries and
material damage. Similarly, cyberattacks on the control systems of driverless
metro, autonomous weapons, industrial plants, or critical infrastructures may
cause enormous damage as well.
This scenario certainly raises challenges for regulators and policymakers
that, in the context of an overall strategy for “responsible innovation,”18 have to
face the ontological difficulty of foreseeing and possibly controlling the impact
of EDTs on economy and society, to make sure that they are human-centric,
ethical, explainable, sustainable and respectful of fundamental rights and
values.19 An ecosystem where both citizens and businesses can trust the
technology they interact with is, in fact, fundamental to both unlocking the
potential of the above-mentioned new technologies and enabling them to
ameliorate people’s lives. An environment of trust and accountability around the
development and use of AI-powered devices and autonomous self-learning
systems includes, therefore, the design of legal rules on civil liability20 – or the
adaptation of existing ones – to the risks generated by their use.
The adequacy and completeness of liability regimes in the face of
technological challenges are indeed crucial for society. If the system is
inadequate or flawed or has shortcomings in dealing with the damages caused
by EDTs, victims may end up partially compensated. On the other hand, an
overprotective liability regime risks to stifle the development and use of EDTs
– and in the last instance, innovation – by introducing systems that
overcompensate for harm generated during the operation of such technologies.
In this context, many are the questions that arise and are in need of an
answer. Does the current legislative framework in the EU address all the possible
damages that can derive from the use of EDTs, or encompass a general clause
suitable to cover all of them? What – if any – gaps do the current legal
framework reveal? What possible amendments are currently being studied and
proposed? Given the features of emerging digital technologies, would a onesize-fits-all solution be preferable, or should a technology-specific oriented
solution be adopted? Does it make sense to recognize autonomous systems as
legal entities that may be held liable in damages? Should specific obligations be

17 On a similar case, see the RAPEX notification from Germany published in the EU Safety Gate website
(A12/1671/15).
18 This concept, intended to emphasize the role of responsibility in shaping and promoting innovation, is
gaining increasing attention among scholars and policy makers. On this, see B.J. KOOPS, I.
OOSTERLAKEN, H. ROMIJN, T. SWIERSTRA, J. VAN DEN HOVEN (EDS), RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION 2.
CONCEPTS, APPROACHES, AND APPLICATIONS (Springer 2015).
19 There is a lively discourse around ethical issues raised by new technologies, as analyzed in M.D.
DUBBER, F. PASQUALE, S. DAS (EDS), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS OF AI (Oxford U. Press
2020);M. COECKELBERGH, AI ETHICS (The MIT Press 2020). With specific regard to algorithmic
transparency and the need to shift from a black-box society to an intelligent one, see F. PASQUALE,
THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 218 (Harvard University Press 2015)(“Rather than contort ourselves to fit
‘an impersonal economy lacking a truly human purpose,’ we might ask how institutions could be reshaped to meet higher ends than shareholder value . . . Black box services are often wondrous to behold,
but our black box society has become dangerously unstable, unfair, and unproductive. Neither New
York quants nor California engineers can deliver a sound economy or a secure society. Those are the
tasks of a citizenry, which can perform its job only as well as it understands the stakes”).
20 This work focuses on civil liability, to be distinguished from criminal. Later in this work, the term
liability is used by the court to refer to civil liability.
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imposed on providers of EDTs as to the design of the technology (i.e., “safety
by design”)? Should safe harbours aim at enabling a data-driven economy be
adopted? Where to strike a balance between the need to compensate victims and
encouraging innovation?
To answer the above questions, one should identify the normative
foundations on which a liability regime for new technologies may be built on.21
While it is often maintained that the objective of the liability system is to
compensate victims, this cannot be the only goal of regulators, but it should go
hand-in-hand with promoting innovation by providing incentives towards those
actors who are best situated to take precautions against harm. To do this, it is
crucial to understand whether the existing rules present gaps in considering the
possible damages that occur in the context of the use of IoT, AI, advanced
robotics and autonomous systems, and to identify possible solutions that would
build trust in these technologies. All this can take place only by striking a balance
between the need to compensate possible victims and the desire to incentivize
innovation. The adequacy and completeness of liability regimes in the face of
technological challenges are indeed crucially important for society. If the system
is inadequate or flawed or has shortcomings in dealing with damages caused by
emerging digital technologies, victims may end up totally or partially
uncompensated, even though an overall equitable analysis may make the case
for indemnifying them. The social impact of a potential inadequacy in the
existing legal regimes to address new risks created by emerging digital
technologies might compromise the expected benefits. In addition, certain
factors, such as the ever-increasing presence of emerging digital technologies in
all aspects of social life and the multiplying effect of automation, can also
exacerbate the damage these technologies cause. Damages can easily become
viral and rapidly propagate in a densely interconnected society. For these
reasons, answering the question as to whether the current liability regime is fit
to encompass the damages that might derive from the use of EDTs is urgent and
crucial to their own development. The envisaging of possible solutions is also
crucial were the current liability regime not completely fit to address the changes
brought about by the EDTs.
In the following paragraphs, we seek to ascertain whether the current
liability regimes are fit for the new digital environment and to envisage possible
measures to face the new reality. To this end, Section 1 preliminary reconstructs
the current liability framework, which at the European level is quite fragmented
and only partially harmonised. Section 2 analyses the feature of EDTs to
illustrate how they challenge the current legal landscape, to the point of
questioning traditional liability notions – as explained in Section 3. Section 4
surveys the EU institutions’ position on these challenges and Section 5 focuses
on the findings of the Report on Liability for AI and emerging digital
technologies,22 as it provides a valid starting point for discussing any
adjustments that may be needed. Finally, Section 6 highlights the need for a

21 Rolf H. Weber & Dominic N. Staiger, New Liability Patterns in the Digital Era, EU INTERNET L. 197
(2017).
22 Report of the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies - New Technologies Formation,
Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other Emerging Digital Technologies (2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid=36
608.
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multi-faced approach to tackle the ever-changing issues raised by EDTs through
an overview of the most viable options to complement liability rules, also from
an ex-ante perspective.
I. THE CURRENT LEGAL LIABILITY FRAMEWORK WITHIN THE EU
To understand how the development and use of EDTs impact the current
liability notions is necessary to preliminary reconstruct the current liability
framework, which at the European level is only partially harmonised.23 The
existing EU tort law rules are, in fact, limited product liability law under
Directive 85/374/EC (“PLD”),24 liability for infringing data protection law
(Article 82 of the GDPR),25 and liability for infringing competition law
(Directive 2014/104/EU).26 There is also a well-established regime governing
liability insurance with regard to damage caused by the use of motor vehicles
(Directive 2009/103/EC),27 which though does not touch upon liability for
accidents itself. Similarly, not dealing directly with liability but with product
safety is the regime introduced under Directive 2001/95/EC on general product
safety,28 which requires that products (with the exceptions of pharmaceuticals,
medical devices, and food) meet all statutory safety requirements provided by
EU and national laws or comply with national standards.
Similarly, at a national level, there are no Member States’ liability
provisions that contain liability rules specifically applicable to damage resulting
from the use of EDTs, with the exception of those jurisdictions that have
regulated the use of AVs, where they also provide for coverage of any damages
caused, by insurance or by reference to the general rules.29 At the moment,

23 Ken Oliphant, Cultures of Tort Law in Europe, 3 J. EUR.TORT L. 147 (2012); Mauro Bussani & Marta
Infantino, Tort Law and Legal Cultures, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 77 (2015).
24 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products (1985)
O.J. (L 210) [“hereinafter” PLD]. A thorough account of the PLD is provided in D. Fairgrieve, G.
Howells, P. Møgelvang-Hansen, G. Straetmans, D. Verhoeven, P. Machnikowski, A. Janssen, R.
Schulze, Product Liability Directive, EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE
OF THE ART IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 17 (Cambridge U. Press 2016). See also Micheal G.
Faure, Economic Analysis of Product Liability, EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
STATE OF THE ART IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 619 (Intersentia 2016).
25 Commission Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on
the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
2016 O.J. (L 119). See also Proposal for Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications, Art.
22, COM (2017) 10 final.
26 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on
Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages under National Law for Infringements of the
Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the European Union Text with EEA
relevance, 2014 O.J. (L 349).
27 Directive 2009/103/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 Relating
to Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect of the Use of Motor Vehicles, and the Enforcement of
the Obligation to Insure Against Such Liability ,2009 O.J. (L 263).
28 Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on General
Product Safety, 2002 O.J. (L 11).
29 See, among many, Rustin Diehl & Matthew I. Thue, Autonomous Vehicle Testing Legislation: A
Review of Best Practices from States on the Cutting Edge, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 197 (2016); and, in
the US: Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile
Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1611 (2017).
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therefore, harmful damages that arise during the use of EDTs are likely to be
compensated under existing rules in tort and contract law.
In general, domestic tort laws include a rule introducing fault-based liability
with a broad scope of application, accompanied by several more specific rules
which either modify the premises of fault-liability (especially in the distribution
of the burden of proof) or establish liability independently from fault (strict or
risk-based liability). Most liability regimes also encompass the notion of liability
for others (indirect or vicarious liability), which can, in turn, be – depending on
the case or the country – fault- or risk-based.
While this is not the place to engage in a comparative analysis of each
Member State’s liability framework, it is worth pointing out that they all share
some common principles. A general rule of liability for fault is, in fact, part of
the legal systems of all EU members, and it is also central to the principles
restating the common core of European private law.30 In a nutshell, when an
actor fails to take due care, and this negligence causes harm to another – or she
causes such harm intentionally – this actor is liable to compensate the victim.
Usually, what triggers liability is harm to the fundamental interests of a person,
such as life, health, bodily integrity, freedom of movement, private property, and
in some countries also purely economic losses and harm to human dignity. In
addition, all Member States’ legal systems encompass product liability as a
result of the PLD implementation. On this base, a damage claim for harm
generated by a defective product does not require a finding of fault on the part
of the manufacturer, as, in principle, this should be a strict – not fault-based –
liability.31 However, the regime that the PLD introduces resembles more a
watered-down version of negligence liability than a strict liability regime since
a claimant must, in any case, prove the defect and that such defect generates the
harm that she suffered.32 Moreover, limits to the compensation may be imposed,
depending on the national implementation of the directive, and manufacturers
may show that the defect was not linked to their activity (alleging, for example,
the risk development defence).33 In sum, for as much as product liability could
be of any use, it only covers damages generated by defective products, leaving
outside the provision of services, for which then the default negligence-based
regime revives.
As a result, the current EU scenario is quite fragmented. In the first place,
even though fault-based liability is a common ground, negligence and fault can
be given different interpretations across Member States. In the second place,
although the PLD should in principle introduce a harmonized strict liability
regime for defective products, in practice, its implementation has not been
consistent in all Member States and, in any case, it does not seem to encompass
many of the instances generated by the use of EDTs.34 In the third place, the
hypotheses of strict and vicarious liability heavily depend on the traditions of

30 EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW (ED), PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW, Art. 1.101 (1)-(2)
http://civil.udg.edu/php/biblioteca/items/283/PETL.pdf. For a comment, see F.D. BUSNELLI ET AL.,
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: TEXT AND COMMENTARY (Springer 2005).
31 Id., Recital 2, “liability without fault”.
32 PLD, supra note 24, at art. 4.
33 See infra para. 4.
34 For a survey of the issues as to the application of the Product Liability Directive to the EDTs, see
Charlotte de Meeus, The Product Liability Directive at the Age of the Digital Industrial Revolution:
Fit for Innovation?, 8 J. OF EUROPEAN CONSUMER AND MARKET L. 149 (2019).
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each national legal framework, and therefore, they cover a set of not uniform
cases. Overall, disparities in Member States' legislation and case-law concerning
liability may produce distortions of competition and impair the smooth
functioning of the single digital market,35 while the moderate pace with which
the European legislator usually proceeds with legislative harmonization may no
longer be adequate to keep up with the rapid changes brought by EDTs.36
II. NEW TECHNOLOGIES, NEW FEATURES
Against the background of the current liability regime(s) in Europe, the
question arises as to whether they are fit for the new digital era comes from the
fact that EDTs present features that are unknown to the previous generation of
technologies. Namely: complexity, opacity, autonomy, predictability, openness,
data-drivenness, and vulnerability.37 Even though these features are gradual in
nature, their combination may, however, seriously challenge the traditional
liability notions.
On the one hand, EDTs demonstrate a high degree of complexity due to the
interdependency between the different components and layers, ranging from
tangible parts and devices (e.g. sensors, actuators, hardware), to software
components, data, and connectivity features. The presence of numerous
interdependencies in the value chain increases the variety of players involved,
which in turn amplifies the overall complication. In addition, the more complex
EDTs become, the less those exposed to them can comprehend the processes
that may have caused harm to themselves or to others.
The opacity of these systems may only increase when self-learning features
are in place, as algorithms no longer come as readable code but amount to black
boxes that are almost impossible to understand.
It is this same self-learning capability that makes EDTs autonomous, i.e.
capable of performing tasks and interact with the surrounding environment with
less, or entirely without, human control or supervision. Many of the operations
provided through and by EDTs can be almost fully autonomous, as IoT-devices,
advanced robots and all systems empowered by AI are developing increased
capabilities to interpret the environment (via sensing, actuating, cognitive vision,
machine learning, etc.), to interact with humans, to cooperate with other actors,
to learn new behaviours, and execute actions autonomously without human

35 Awareness of this can be found in Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 40.
36 Jorge Morais Carvalho & Kristin Nemeth, Time for a Change? Product Liability in the Digital Era, J.
OF EUROPEAN CONSUMER AND MARKET L. 160 (2019).
37 With specific regard to AI, an additional feature has been flagged as riskful: AI intrinsic
monomaniacality towards its objectives, which is especially dangerous when AI autonomously makes
decisions and interacts with third parties. The main AI goals are in fact: (i) preserving itself in order to
maximize the satisfaction of its final objectives, (ii) preserving the content of its final objectives; (iii)
improving its rationality, intelligence and decision-making process, to maximize the satisfaction of the
final objectives; (iv) acquiring as many resources as possible for the satisfaction of the final objectives
of the AI. All this could lead to unexpected risks and make traditional liability rules unsuitable. See,
Giovanni Comandè, Intelligenza artificiale e responsabilità tra liability e accountability. Il carattere
trasformativo dell’IA e il problema della responsabilità, 1 ANALISI GIURIDICA DELL’ECONOMIA 169,
179 (2019).
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intervention. However, the more autonomous systems are, the less they depend
on other players (i.e. manufacturers, owners, users, etc.), the greater their impact
on their environment and on third parties is.38
From the ability to operate autonomously by virtue of their interaction with
the environment derives EDTs’ unpredictability. Many systems are in fact
designed to not only respond to pre-defined stimuli, but to identify and classify
new ones and link them to self-chosen corresponding reactions that have not
been pre-programmed as such. To do this they rely on the data they have been
trained with, as well as the data that they keep collecting while interacting with
the surrounding environment, which in turn alters the initial algorithms. As a
result, the more external data systems are capable of processing, the more
difficult it becomes to foresee the precise impact that they will have once in
operation.
On the other hand, in order to operate and self-develop, EDTs depend on
external information that is not pre-installed but generated by built-in sensors or
communicated from the outside by data sources, in other words they are datadriven. This exposes these new technologies to issues whenever the data is
flawed or missing, due to an error in communication or in relation to the external
or internal source. Strictly linked to the data-driveness is the feature of openness.
In order to operate EDTs need not only to interact with data sources but also
with other systems. They are in fact not completed once put into circulation,
rather, for their nature, they depend upon subsequent inputs, such as updates and
upgrades. For these reasons, EDTs are deemed to be “open by design,” so to
permit external input either via some hardware plugin or through some wireless
connection. However, this constant interaction with outside information is what
also makes these new technologies vulnerable to cybersecurity breaches, which
can cause the systems to malfunction and/or modify its features in a way likely
to cause harm.
All the above-mentioned features, combined with the lack of clear legal
requirements for EDTs, make more difficult for enforcement authorities to check
compliance with applicable legislation and assess liability. In particular,
individuals and legal entities having suffered harm from EDTs products may
lack the means to verify possible breaches of laws, thus prejudicing their
effective access to justice. At the same time, market surveillance and
enforcement authorities may lack adequate technical capabilities for inspecting
EDT systems. In some instances, they may not be empowered to act or even be
uncertain on whether they do have such powers. For instance, the PLD
establishes liability of the manufacturer for damage caused by a defective
product. However, it is not easy at all to prove a defect in an autonomous vehicle
or retrace its decision-making process leading to a car accident, with the
consequence of making more difficult to meet the burden of proof and obtain
compensation under the current EU and national liability legislation. To this

38 Autonomous capabilities and intelligence ungoverned by human directions or supervision could lead
to unexpected outcomes, as shown by the story of Alice and Bob, i.e., two chatbots developed to learn
autonomous bargaining skills that started to interact using their own code, indecipherable for humans.
Andrew Griffin, Facebook's artificial intelligence robots shut down after they start talking to each
other in their own language, THE INDEPENDENT (2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/lifestyle/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-artificial-intelligence-ai-chatbot-new-language-researchopenai-google-a7869706.html.
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regard, transparency and explainability of algorithms embedded in EDTs should
be legally required to help courts to analyse the functioning process of
algorithms, identify any flaw and, accordingly, assign appropriate responsibility
for failures in decision-making.39
III. NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND TRADITIONAL LIABILITY NOTIONS
Because of their features, EDTs raise several open questions as to the
capacity of the known liability regimes to encompass the harm generated by their
use. Indeed, besides the well-known issues of lack of accountability40 and
transparency,41 EDTs do challenge traditional liability concepts such as
damages, causal link, and duty of care.
As for the notion of damages, in addition to traditional damages (harm to
persons and properties), there are also those connected with the transfer of data,
privacy, and confidential information security. Interconnected devices may also
constitute targets of cyber-attacks: in the case of smart homes, for example, poor
security measures at design, manufacturing or operation stage may allow cyberattackers to take control of a device and modify its functioning or the functioning
of other smart devices in the same ecosystem. Now, while injuries to a person
or to a physical property can trigger liability, compensation of pure economic
loss is not universally accepted, nor is the case of destruction of data as property
loss. Similarly, in the scenario in which personality rights are adversely affected,
such as the case in which data is released in violation of the right to privacy,
differences exist among jurisdictions.
The most controversial element of the liability regime is, however, the
causal link between the victim’s harm and the defendant’s sphere. In principle,
in tort law the victim should show that the damage originated by some conduct
or risk attributable to the defendant. However, in the case of EDTs such a proof
can become quite difficult. Interconnected devices, for example, such as smart
homes or AVs, are the result of a combination of hardware, software,
connectivity and data, which may make it impossible to identify the real source
of the damage. Providing evidence of causation is even harder when dealing with
self-learning AI systems fueled by machine learning and deep learning
techniques and based on multiple external data collection. Advanced robots and
all products empowered by AI may in fact act in ways that were not envisaged
at the time that the system was first put into operation, and these behaviours may
be so autonomous to interrupt the causal link. In a strict liability regime, such a
proof could be less problematic as it would be enough to be to prove that the risk
triggering the strict liability materialised; however, strict liability only applies in
very limited cases.
As liability is mainly fault-based, the other fundamental element that the use
of EDTs challenges is the definition of the duty of care that the perpetrator
should have discharged; behaviour that caused then the damage. While statutory

39 Miriam C. Buiten, Towards Intelligent Regulation of Artificial Intelligence, 10(1) EUR. J. OF RISK
REG. 41, 55 (2019).
40 Mayaan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic
Enforcement, 69 FLORIDA L. REV., 181 (2017).
41 FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY, supra note 19.
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language may in certain cases define such duties, in many others they are
reconstructed by the court based on social beliefs about the prudent and
reasonable course of action in the circumstances at stake. In the case of EDTs, a
lack of well-established models of proper functioning of these technologies and
the fact that they develop as a result of learning without direct human control
makes it difficult to apply fault-based liability rules. While the processes running
AI systems cannot all be measured according to duties of care designed for
human conduct, an accepted standard of care for the creation and operation of
autonomous systems has not emerged yet.
Moreover, in some instances it may be hard even to identify the person
obliged to meet such duty of care. In fact, it could be unfair or inefficient to
assign liability for any damage caused by an AI product always to the designer
of the algorithm. Liability should be allocated also to owners and/or users,
depending on the circumstances, but the features of EDTs products make such
allocation of liability not self-evident at all.42 However, according to national
liability regimes, tracing a damage back to a specific person is still a fundamental
prerequisite for any fault-based claim.43 Such difficulties have prompted some
scholars to suggest alternative options that would revolutionize traditional
liability notions. In particular, some scholars urge for joint and several liability
of all subjects involved in the design, programming and deployment of an AI
application.44 However, while this would represent a much appreciated
simplification for users claiming compensation for damage, it might be
ineffective in properly allocating costs and, consequently, setting optimally
prevention incentives for all relevant players.45
Others argue that if AI is an intelligence even able to supersede humans in
a number of areas, such intelligence could be at fault sometimes and,
accordingly, it should be held directly liable. This would require to
reconceptualize intelligent and autonomous machines as entities with the status
of a “person” under the law. With such legal fiction, machines could bear
liability in case of wrongdoing in a way similar to that of legal entities such as
corporations.46 However, this may open up more problems than it solves,

42 For instance, with regard to autonomous weapons: “somehow human responsibility and accountability
for the actions taken by the machine evaporate and disappear. The soldier in the field cannot be
expected to understand in any serious way the programming of the machine; the designers and
programmers operate on a completely different legal standard; the operational planners could not know
exactly how the machine would perform in the fog of war; and finally, there might be no human actors
left standing to hold accountable”. Kenneth Anderson, Matthew C. Waxman, Debating Autonomous
Weapon Systems, their Ethics, and their Regulation under International Law, in R. BROWNSWORD, E.
SCOTFORD, K. YEUNG (EDS), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION AND TECHNOLOGY
1097, 1110 (Oxford University Press 2017).
43 European Commission, On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust,
19.02.20, COM (2020) 65 final, https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/white-paper-artificialintelligence-european-approach-excellence-and-trust_en.
44 David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 117, 149 (2014).
45 Giovanni Comandé, Multilayered (Accountable) Liability for Artificial Intelligence, in SEBASTIAN
LOHSSE, REINER SCHULZE & DIRK STAUDENMAYER (EDS), LIABILITY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 165, 175 (Hart Publishing Nomos 2019).
46 See generally, Jaap Hage, Theoretical foundations for the responsibility of autonomous agents, 25
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE L. 255 (2017); Brandon W. Jackson, Artificial Intelligence and the Fog of
Innovation: A Deep-Dive on Governance and the Liability of Autonomous Systems, 35(4) SANTA
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particularly as to the definition of selection criteria and equity requirements, as
well as to the allocation of costs among all parties involved in the development
and use of AI applications.47 In any case, today at least, legislators and courts
seem far from revolutionizing the traditional notions of liability to introduce
some sort of robot’s fault.
Rather than resorting to conceptually new theories, another – maybe more
viable – option that has been proposed is that of introducing a predetermined,
detailed and acceptable level of care (or quasi-safe-harbor) for designers,
manufacturers, owners and users of EDTs: if the level of care is unmet, a
presumption of negligence and, therefore, liability would be triggered; if met,
the defendant would enjoy a quasi-safe harbor, while the claimant would bear
the burden of proving actual negligence.48
IV. THE EU POLICY ON LIABILITY IN THE CONTEXT OF EDTS
The debate on whether the current liability regime is fit for accommodating
the issues described above is quite lively within the European Union,49 in
particular as to what extent the existing liability schemes are adapted to the
emerging market realities that follow the development of new technologies such
as AI, advanced robotics, IoT, and the like. In this regard, the EU institutions
have adopted a series of documents that in part tackle to topic, in part highlight
the need for further analysis.
For example, in February 2017, the European Parliament adopted a
Resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics with recommendation to the
Commission,50 which proposed a whole range of legislative and non-legislative
initiatives in the field of robotics and AI. In particular, it asked the Commission
to submit a proposal for a legislative instrument providing civil law rules on the
liability of robots and AI, an initiative so far disregarded. In February 2018, the
European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) published a study on “[a]
common EU approach to liability rules and insurance for connected and
autonomous vehicles,”51 as an added value assessment accompanying the
Resolution on Civil Law Rules. On April 25, 2018, the Commission published

CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 35 (2019). This debate has a long history, as shown by Lawrence B. Solum,
Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70(4) NORTH CAROLINA L. REV. 1231 (1992). A case
against treating robots like humans is made by Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of
Humans, J. OF EUR. CONSUMER AND MKT. L., 765 (2017).
47 Giovanni Comandè, Intelligenza artificiale e responsabilità, supra note 37, at 180.
48 Omri Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot Is It Anyway?: Liability for Artificial-Intelligence-Based Robots,
U. OF ILLINOIS L. REV. 1141, 1172-73 (2020).
49 For an analysis of the extent to which tort law may provide remedies to subjects injured by new
technologies in the common law (Anglo-American) tradition see Jonathan Morgan, Torts and
Technology, in ROGER BROWNSWORD, ET AL., (EDS), THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION
AND TECHNOLOGY 522 (Oxford University Press 2017).
50 Resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL. DOC. 2015/2103(INL) (2017),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2017-0051_EN.html. See also, an analysis in
Laura Coppini, Robotica e intelligenza artificiale: questioni di responsabilità civile, 4 POLITICA DEL
DIRITTO 713 (2018).
51 Tatjana Evas, A common EU approach to liability rules and insurance for connected and autonomous
vehicles, European Added Value Assessment Accompanying the European Parliament's Legislative
Own-initiative Report, European Parliamentary Research Service, PE 615.635 (2018).
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a “Staff Working Document on Liability for Emerging Digital Technologies,”52
accompanying the Commission’s Communication on Artificial Intelligence for
Europe,53 which provides the starting point of the discussions on liability and
EDTs.
All these documents, as well as the following Sibiu Communication of May
2019,54 stress that a robust regulatory framework should address the ethical and
legal questions surrounding AI, including those related to liability. In its 2018
AI Communication, the Commission also announced the adoption of a report
assessing the implications of emerging digital technologies on existing safety
and liability frameworks by mid-2019. In its 2019 Work Programme, it
confirmed it would “continue work on the emerging challenge of Artificial
Intelligence by enabling coordinated action across the European Union.”55
Accordingly, on April 2019, the high-level Expert Group on Artificial
Intelligence set up by the European Commission listed liability frameworks
among the non-technical methods for securing and maintaining a lawful and
trustworthy AI,56 on the assumption that an environment of trust is crucial for
fully reaping the benefits of innovation.57
In order to provide an answer, in March 2018, the Commission set up an
Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies,58 operating in two different
formations: the Product Liability Directive formation and the New Technologies
formation. This second formation was in particular asked to assess “whether and
to what extent existing liability schemes are adapted to the emerging market
realities following the development of the new technologies such as Artificial
Intelligence, advanced robotics, the IoT and cybersecurity issues.”59 The experts
were requested to examine whether the current liability regimes are still
“adequate to facilitate the uptake of . . . new technologies by fostering
investment stability and users’ trust.”60 In case of shortcomings, the expert group

52 Commission Staff Working Document, Liability for emerging digital technologies, accompanying the
document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
Artificial intelligence for Europe, SWD/2018/137 final (2018).
53 Communication of the European Commission, Artificial Intelligence for Europe, COM (2018) 237
final
(Apr.
25,
2018),
.https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018SC0137.
54 European Commission, Preparing for a more united, stronger and more democratic Union in an
increasingly uncertain world, contribution to the informal EU27 leaders' meeting in Sibiu (Romania),
(May
9,
2019),
.https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/betapolitical/files/euco_sibiu_communication_en.pdf.
55 Communication of the European Commission, Commission Work Programme 2019: delivering what
we promised and preparing for the future, COM (2018) 800 final, (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cwp_2019_en.pdf.
56 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, at 6, 22,
(Apr. 8, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/ai-alliance-consultation/guidelines.
57 Communication of the European Commission, Building Trust in Human-Centric Artificial
Intelligence,
COM
(2019)
168
final
(Apr.
8,
2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/communities/sites/jrccties/files/ec_ai_ethics_communication_8_april_2019.p
df.
58 See European Commission Expert Groups, Expert Group on liability and new technologies, (Mar. 9,
2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3592.
59 See European Commission Expert Groups, Call for Applications for the Selection of Members of the
Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies, (E03592) (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3592.
60 Id.
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was invited to make recommendations for amendments, without being limited
to existing national and EU legal instruments. However, recommendations were
to be limited to matters of extracontractual liability, leaving aside in particular
corresponding (and complementary) rules on safety and other technical
standards. As a result of the expert group’s activity in November 2019 the Report
“Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other Emerging Digital Technologies”61
was published. This undertakes an assessment of existing liability regimes in the
wake of emerging technologies and it concludes that the current ones in force in
the Member States ensure at least basic protection of victims whose damage is
caused by the operation of such new technologies, while also hinting to the
adjustments that might be needed.62
The need for some adjustments is confirmed by the recently adopted White
Paper on artificial intelligence to foster excellence and trust63 and by the Report
on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of
Things and robotics.64 Both documents stress the ultimate goal being to ensure
remediation of damage caused by emerging digital technologies and overall
reliability, while promoting investment stability and, more generally,
innovation. In this context, efficient liability rules are indeed paramount for
trustworthiness, which in turn is a prerequisite for the uptake of emerging digital
technologies. Pursuing such a strategy is also deemed a crucial step to strengthen
European technology sovereignty and affirms the role of the European Union on
the international stage as “the most attractive, secure and dynamic data-agile
economy in the world,”65 despite a fierce global competition.66
For the purpose of achieving these goals, the European Commission
suggests a regulatory and investment-oriented approach, entailing, among other
things, adjustments to current European and national liability regimes. Indeed, a
fragmented legal landscape sprinkled of different national initiatives could lead
to the fragmentation of the single market and, consequently, endanger not just
legal certainty, but also the emergence of a dynamic and flourishing European
industry. For this reason, the European Commission stresses the importance of
aligning the efforts at European, national, and regional level,67 while promoting

61 Report, supra note 22.
62 See infra para. 5.
63 White Paper, supra note 43.
64 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic
and Social Committee, Report on the safety and liability implications of Artificial Intelligence, the
Internet of Things and robotics, COM (2020) 64 final (Feb. 19, 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2020%3A64%3AFIN.
65 White Paper, supra note 43, at 3.
66 The European Union is closely involved in EDTs-related work which is ingoing in multilateral fora,
including the Council of Europe, the United Nations (UN) the United Nations Educational Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s (OECD), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU). For instance, the European Union has contributed to development
of the OECD’s ethical principles for AI, subsequently endorsed by the G20 in its June 2019 Ministerial
Statement on Trade and Digital Economy, see generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence,
https://www.oecd.org/goingdigital/ai/principles/.
67 Stronger coordination is encouraged in Communication of the European Commission, see
Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence, COM (2018) 795 final (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=56018, regarding a plan among the
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partnership between the private and the public sector towards an “ecosystem of
excellence” with proper incentives to research, innovation and deployment,68 an
“ecosystem of trust” duly protecting fundamental rights and consumers’ rights69
such as privacy and non-discrimination,70 and through liability rules.
In line with the Report from the expert group, the European Commission’s
analysis of the current legal frameworks concludes for the adaptations of current
norms and the adoption of new specific legislation, pursuing a targeted, riskbased approach, and ensuring effective enforcement. In order to address both
current and anticipated technological, societal and commercial developments,
such revised regulatory framework should effectively balance protection and
innovation, while not being excessively prescriptive and burdensome for
businesses.
In addition, establishing a European governance structure with specific
regard to EDTs could foster a fruitful cooperation of national competent
authorities for a number of tasks, including identification of emerging trends,
exchange of information and best practice, advise on standards and
certifications, stakeholders’ participation, audits and assessments.71
V. THE REPORT ON LIABILITY FOR AI AND EMERGING DIGITAL
TECHNOLOGIES: A CALL FOR ADJUSTMENTS?
Among the several communications and documents issued by European
institutions, the Report on Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other emerging
digital technologies (“Report”) that has been recently adopted by the Expert

European Commission, Member States, Norway, and Switzerland for some 70 joint actions in the
following key areas: (i) increasing investment, (ii) making more data available, (iii) fostering talent,
and (iv) ensuring trust. The plan will run until 2027, with regular monitoring and update. As mentioned
in the White Paper, a revision of the Coordinated Plan is expected by end 2020, taking into account
also the results of the public consultation on the White Paper, see supra note 43, at 5.
68 To foster investments, the European Commission has proposed a number of measures under the Digital
Europe Programme, Horizon Europe and the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021 to 2027. On
this, see European Commission, Info session Horizon 2020: Artificial intelligence for manufacturing,
(Nov. 18, 2019), .https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/info-session-horizon-2020artificial-intelligence-manufacturing. A key role is recognized to Digital Innovation Hubs, see
European Commission, Digital Innovation Hubs: helping companies across the economy make the
most of digital opportunities, (Jan. 12, 2021), https://ec.europe.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/digital-innovation-hubs-helping-companies-across-economy-make-mostdigitalopportunities. According to the European Commission, making the European Union a lighthouse
centre of research requires also upskilling the workforce, offering world-leading masters programmes,
and attracting the best professors and scientists, see White Paper, supra note 43, at 7.
69 The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29, 2005 O.J. (L 149/22) (EC); and the Consumer
Rights Directive 2011/83, 2011 O.J. (L 304/64) (EC).
70 The EU legislative framework protecting against discrimination encompasses the Race Equality
Directive 2000/43/EC, the Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation 2000/78/EC,
the Directives on equal treatment between men and women in relation to employment and access to
goods and services 2004/113/EC and 2006/54/EC. In addition, as from 2025, the Directive (EU)
2019/882 on the accessibility requirements for products and services will apply. It is noteworthy that
the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men is expected to
publish by the end of the year an ‘Opinion on Artificial Intelligence’ analysing, among other things,
the impact of AI on gender equality. In fact, AI risks intensifying gender inequalities, as stated in the
Communication of the European Commission, A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 20202025,
COM
(2020)
152
final
(Mar.
5,
2020),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0152&from=EN.
71 Id. at 24.
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72

Group appointed by the European Commission represents detailed and
insightful indications on the way in which the EU intend addressing the issue of
EDTs and liability. Interestingly enough, in its assessment of existing liability
regimes in the wake of emerging digital technologies, the expert group
concludes that the rules in force in the Member States ensure at least basic
protection of victims for damages generated in the use of EDTs. However, the
specific characteristics of these technologies and their applications make it more
difficult to offer these victims a claim for compensation in all cases where this
seems justified. It may also be the case that the allocation of liability is unfair or
inefficient. To rectify this, it is likely that some adjustments need to be made to
EU and national liability regimes. By saying this, the Report confirms the issueoriented approach that the EU institutions have adopted within the Single Market
Strategy.73
Being therefore aware that a size-fits-all solution is not possible, the Report
identifies four main categories where adjustments may be needed: (i) cases
where a (reinterpreted) product liability can still be applied; (ii) cases in which
strict liability should be extended also to other entities; (iii) cases in which there
is the need to further develop the notion of duty of care; and (iv) cases that can
be addresses though vicarious liability, by equalling the device to a human
auxiliary.
A. TOWARD A (REINTERPRETED) PRODUCT LIABILITY
As a starter, product liability remains a very useful tool to address the
damages that may occur in the use of EDTs, as long as a defect can be
identified.74 However, to use product liability, there are some adjustments that
the current regime introduced by the PLD needs to undertake. After all, the PLD
was adopted in a completely different context from the current one, more than
thirty years old in the pre-digital age.75
In the first place, the PLD should be interpreted in a way that it encompasses
also digital content and services (for example, health, financial, and transport
services based on stand-alone software leveraging AI technology) and not just
tangible products. Such extensions to stand-alone algorithms could be justified
by the rationale of the PLD itself, adopted exactly to address the issues posed by
the mass distribution of standardised products available to the general public.76
While once digital content might not have been commonly used, nowadays, it
fulfils many of the functions that tangible movable items used to when the PLD
was drafted and adopted. For this reason, damages caused by defective digital
content should trigger the producer’s liability, in particular in the case in which
defective digital elements are linked to other products, some of which come
separately from the tangible item (for example, an application to be downloaded
into the user’s house assistant), or in the case of updates taking place after a

72 Report, supra note 22.
73 Id. at 15-16.
74 Id. at 27-28.
75 K. Nemeth & Carvalho, supra note 36; Meeus, supra note 34.
76 Jean-Sebastien Borghetti, Civil Liability for Artificial Intelligence: What Should its Basis Be?, 17 LA
REVUE DES JURISTES DE SCIENCES PO 95, 96 (2019).
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product has entered the market. In the second place, it is likely that if the digital
content is defective, it will be extremely hard for the claimant to identify the
causal link between the harm and the defect. In these cases, therefore, an
inversion of the burden of proof might be needed, or at least the burden of proof
should be alleviated with regard to the causal relationship between a defect and
the damage. Lastly, the possibility for the producers to invoke the
unpredictability of the defect should be eliminated in those cases in which it was
foreseeable that the technology would develop unpredictably. In other words,
the risk development defence, which allows the producer to avoid liability for
unforeseeable defects, should not be available in cases where it was predictable
that unforeseen developments might occur.78
In addition to the recommendations of the Report, it could be argued that
existing legislation focuses on the safety risks present at the time that a product
is placed on the market. However, proper attention should be given to changing
functionalities of EDTs systems, in light of the fact that the frequency of
software updates and the ever-evolving features of machine learning may entail
important product changes during their lifecycle, thus posing risks unexpected
at the time of placing on the market. This is especially true in the event that AI
software is integrated into a product when the latter is already on the market. In
these circumstances, it should be mandatory to conduct new risks assessments
and implement adequate measures, including the obligation to maintain
transparency, human oversight and quality of data throughout the product
lifecycle.79
Also, it could be argued that the scope of application should be extended.
On the one hand, while the PLD regulates liability of manufacturers, it is still up
to Member States to govern liability of others in the supply chain. It would be
advisable to properly allocate responsibilities among different economic
operators at the European level, and to require cooperation among economic
operators in the supply chain, and with users as well. On the other hand, the
concept of safety itself is subject to changes, along with the constant evolution
of the threat landscape and the possible categories of damage. For instance, risks
deriving from loss of connectivity are not yet explicitly addressed in current
legislation, nor more apparently futuristic risks such as mental ones resulting
from user collaboration with humanoid robots. Accordingly, the notion of safety
should be clarified and broadened.80
Another notion which may no longer be adequate, especially in light of the
widespread use of software, is that of defect.81 In fact, the mere fact that a

77 This is also in line with what was provided in two recently published directives: Directive (EU)
2019/771 on the sale of goods provided that a seller is also liable for such digital elements being in
conformity with the contract, including for updates provided for as long a period as the consumer may
reasonably expect, and Directive (EU) 2019/770 established a similar regime for digital content and
digital services. Council Directive 2019/770, 2019 O.J. (L. 136), 1 (EU); Council Directive 2019/771,
2019 O.J. (L. 136), 28 (EU).
78 See Council Directive 2019/771, supra note 77.
79 White Paper, supra note 43, at 14–15.
80 Id. at 15.
81 Art. 6(1) of the PLD, supra note 24, provides as follows: “A product is defective when it does not
provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including:
(a) the presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product
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product with an embedded algorithm causes harm does not make it defective.
All the methods traditionally adopted by courts to establish a defect may not be
always suitable for algorithms—in particular, (i) proof of malfunctioning may
not be obvious in the event of a wrong medical diagnosis delivered by an AI
system, as it may not necessarily derive from defective design; (ii) proof of the
breach of safety standards may not be a viable path if they are not updated as
quickly as technology develops; (iii) comparing risks and benefits associated to
the use of a product may not be straightforward when they are of different nature,
except, for instance, for pharmaceutical products where risks and benefits have
the same nature; (iv) comparing two competing products would be hard when it
comes to algorithms, because the overall outcomes should be taken into account,
rather than the result of each algorithm in a single set of circumstances. In any
case, the fact that an algorithm is less good than another one does not necessarily
make the former defective. Otherwise, the market would have only one nondefective algorithm at time—the best one; and (v) a comparison with what a
reasonable person would have done in the same circumstances would be tricky
when AI is involved, especially considering that recourse to AI is usually
justified by the assumption that it performs better than humans.82
The difficulties surrounding the notions of fault and defect in relation to
EDTs could encourage a shift from fault-based liability to strict liability.
B. STRICT LIABILITY
In relation to strict liability, the Report states that this could be appropriate
only when the risks generated by the EDTs concretize in a public space. If this
is the case, the person who is in control of the risk connected with the operation
of the EDT and who benefits from its operation should be held liable.83 In
practice, this is the regime that already applies in some Member States to
autonomous vehicles and in some cases that applies also to drones. However,
the situation varies significantly among jurisdictions, for example in relation to
the coverage of economic loss, which is provided only in few countries. Instead,
EDTs that move in public spaces (namely vehicles, drones and the like) are
likely to require a general rule of strict liability within the whole single digital
market for the significant harm to third parties that they can cause.
Interestingly enough, the Report also points out that, in particular in the
context of autonomous cars, the concept of operators is preferable to that of
“owner”, “user” or “keeper” of the technology.84 While, in the past, the vast
majority of accidents used to be caused by human error, in the future most
accidents will be caused by the malfunctioning of technology, though not
necessarily of the autonomous vehicle itself. The term “operator” refers to the
person who is in control of the risk connected with the operation of EDTs and
who benefits from such operation. For example, in the case of a fleet of

would be put; (c) the time when the product was put into circulation.” In other words, a product can
be considered defective when it is unreasonably or abnormally dangerous. To this regard, see Joined
Cases C-503/13 and C-504/13, Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v. AOK Sachsen-Anhalt – Die
Gesundheitskasse and Betriebskrankenkasse RWE, 2015 ECR-148.
82 Borghetti, supra note 76, at 97–98.
83 Report, supra note 22, at 39.
84 Id. at 40–41.
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autonomous vehicles, the operator is likely to be the entity that organizes,
maintains and offers the services and it is on the operator that a strict liability
regime should be imposed on, without the exclusion of product liability on the
side of the producer in case of a defective element.
While it may not be desirable to apply a strict liability regime to any damage
caused by EDTs, it may be sensible to do so with regard to specific sectors, such
as autonomous vehicles, domestic robots and medicine.85
C. THE NOTION OF DUTY OF CARE
In the opinion of the experts the issue which is likely to require further
attention is the identification of a duty of care, whereby in the use of EDTs, the
acting person should apply ordinary prudence as applied by the pater familias (a
Roman law concept) under similar circumstances, in view of an objective
business rationale and the features of EDTs’ environment. While it is known
that, in the case of more traditional technologies, operators have to discharge a
range of duties of care that span from the choice of technology—in particular in
light of the tasks to be performed and the operator’s own skills and abilities—to
the organisational framework—in particular with regard to proper training and
monitoring—and to maintenance, the real contours of a duty of care in the use
of EDTs is still to be established.86 In order to refine the concept of duty of care
in the context of EDTs, Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and, accordingly,
liability mitigation strategies could point the way.87
In addition, the Report also highlights the need to consider that producers
have to share part of this enhanced duty of care by designing, describing and
marketing products in a way effectively enabling operators to comply with their
duties; and by adequately monitoring the product after putting it into
circulation.88 This is because the more advanced technologies become, the more
difficult it is for operators to develop the right skills and discharge all duties.
While the risk of insufficient skills should still be borne by the operators, it
would be unfair to leave producers entirely out of the equation.
D. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
One option proposed for addressing the risks of emerging digital technology
is the potential expansion of the notion of vicarious liability, which could be
applied to situations where autonomous technologies are used in place of human
auxiliaries.89 In other words, when harm is caused by an autonomous technology
used in a way functionally equivalent to the employment of a human auxiliary,
the operator’s liability for making use of the technology should correspond to
the existing vicarious liability regime of a principal for its own auxiliaries. This
equivalent application encounters however two main issues. Firstly, vicarious
liability regimes are modelled primarily on human behaviours, while in the case

85 Borghetti, supra note 76, at 100.
86 Report, supra note 22, at 44.
87 See Rolf H. Weber, Liability in the Internet of Things, 6 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN CONSUMER AND
MARKET. LAW 207 (2017).
88 Report, supra note 22, at 45.
89 Id. at 45–46.
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of a technological auxiliary there is not a human behaviour to assess. Secondly,
vicarious liability regimes are highly different across Member States and the
recourse to them runs the risk to incremental increase in the degree of
fragmentation. Now, the first obstacle may be overcome by deciding that when
an autonomous technology outperforms a human auxiliary, the duty of care
should be determined by the performance of a comparable available technology
which the operator could be expected to use.90 The fragmentation issue however
cannot be overcome without intervening on the Member States’ national
regimes.
E. LOGGING BY DESIGN, COMMERCIAL OR TECHNOLOGICAL UNITS
Beside the adjustment so far mentioned, the Report introduces two main
novelties that ought to be carefully considered as they are likely to significantly
contribute to govern the issue of EDTs and liability in the near future. These
amount to the requirement of logging by design91 and to the notion of
commercial or technological units.92
As to the former, EDTs offer unprecedented possibilities of reliable and
detailed documentation of events that may enable the identification of what has
caused an accident. This can usually be done using log files, which is why the
expert group suggests to impose, under certain circumstances, a duty to provide
for appropriate logging and to disclose the data to the victim in a readable format.
The real innovation though is about the effects of a lack of compliance with the
logging obligations, which would trigger a rebuttable presumption that the
condition of liability to be proven by the missing information is fulfilled.93 In
other words, the absence of logged information—or the failure to give the victim
reasonable access to it—would reverse the burden of proof and significantly ease
the life of a claimant.
As to the latter—the notion of commercial or technological unit—it refers
to the digital ecosystem that two or more persons cooperate to create on a
contractual or similar basis. A commercial or technological unit is a notion that
becomes very useful in complex contexts such as the Internet of the Things,
where it becomes almost impossible for the claimant to identify a specific
tortfeasor.94 In such a case all the entities that are part of the unit—for example
all the diverse producers or operators of the various devices that contribute to
the creation of a smart house—are to be considered part of the same unit and—
in the expert group’s opinion—to be deemed jointly and severally liable.95 The
reason why such a notion ought to be adopted is that it would avoid the risk to
undercompensate victims of damages derived from complex technologies as
compared with those that are damaged by technologies that are manufactured or
operated by just one clearly identifiable producer. In determining, finally, what
counts as a commercial and technological unit the Report pinpoints several
elements, among which a joint or coordinated marketing activity for the different

90 Id. at 46.
91 See id. at 47–49.
92 See id. at 55–57.
93 Id. at 48.
94 See Weber, supra note 87, at 207–212.
95 Report, supra note 22, at 56.
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elements of the complex EDT at issue; the degree of their technical
interdependency and interoperation; and lastly the degree of specificity or
exclusivity of their combination.96
VI. COMPLEMENTING LIABILITY: SOFT LAW, ACCOUNTABILITY AND USERS’
EMPOWERMENT, COMPENSATION FUNDS AND INSURANCE SCHEMES
The question of remedying damage deriving from the use of EDTs ignites
the debate between those who would favor the free development of the market
and those who invoke the expansion of the rules of liability, as well as between
those who believe in the adequacy of the current legal framework and those who
instead emphasize the need to introduce ad hoc instruments to keep up with
technological advancements.97
In any case, any initiative focusing just on written rules, rather than aiming
to affect the practices and incentives of industry participants would expose to
the risk of stifling innovation or missing the goal of compensating victims.98 It
could be argued that the right balance between innovation and protection could
hardly be found by industry participants alone, especially if left in an uncertain
legal landscape as the current one, or, worse, in a regulatory vacuum. On the
contrary, the right balance should be actively pursued by public regulators,
following the adoption of a risk-based approach and on the basis of a continuous
exchange of information with researchers and professionals,99 on the assumption
that EDTs are too diverse a category – in terms of purposes, capabilities, and so
on—to allow a one-size-fits-all approach of dealing with related liability
issues.100
Even after liability rules are amended according to the adjustments proposed
in the previous sections so to properly tackle the ever-changing issues of the
algorithmic society, the resulting liability framework would still offer remedies
to the victims of wrongdoing after the damage occurs and a court rules in favor
of the claimant. Instead, it would be sensible to complement such ex post
mechanism with “soft” guidelines, codes of conduct, standards, best practices
and human impact statements101 aimed at guiding ex ante the conduct of
designer, developers, owners and users of EDTs, to prevent damage from
occurring at all. In other words, soft law could play a crucial role as an
96 Id.
97Marta Infantino, La responsabilità per danni algoritmici: propsettive europeo-continentali, 5
RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE E PREVIDENZA 1762 (2019).
98 Id. at 1801.
99 Regulatory issues connected to AI, with a focus on the role of public and private actors, are analyzed
in Michael Guihot, Anne F. Matthew, & Nicolas P. Suzor, Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to
Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
LAW 385 (2017).
100 See Ioannis Revolidis, A & Alan Dahi, The Peculiar Case of the Mushroom Picking Robot: Extracontractual Liability, in Robotics, in MARCELO CORRALES, MARK FENWICK & NIKOLAUS FORGÓ
(EDS), ROBOTICS, AI AND THE FUTURE OF LAW, PERSPECTIVES IN LAW, BUSINESS AND INNOVATION
57 (Spring 2018).
101 With specific regard to AI, see Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 107–116 (2019), according to whom “in the absence of oversight,
a mixture of industry self-regulation and whistleblower engagement offers us one path forward in the
future direction of civil rights law to address the issues raised by AI,” especially for issues of lack of
transparency and bias. Id. at 140.
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instrument of early regulation, rather than subsequent reaction.
Further
advantages could stem from the fact that self-regulation is by definition
developed by private actors—such as professional associations and committees
of experts—who are far more knowledgeable with the technical complexities of
EDTs than public regulators. Moreover, they could update soft law rules much
faster than any public regulator—and this is critical to keeping up with the everevolving technological landscape.
Guidelines, standards, codes of conduct and best practices can become
legally relevant by establishing the principle of accountability at the legislative
level. The principle of accountability requires professionals and businesses to
take responsibility for their initiatives and activities, by taking measures
adequate to the level of risks and by being able to demonstrate compliance with
law and best practices. In particular, borrowing the approach successfully
adopted in data protection legislation,103 subjects involved in the design,
development and use of EDTs should conduct risks assessment analyses and,
consequently, take appropriate action from an organizational and technical
standpoint to foresee and prevent, or at least mitigate, any risk potentially
incurred by any stakeholder because of EDTs.104 Moreover, periodic review of
impact assessment, combined with demonstrable governance processes, regular
audits and contractually-binding instructions for business partners, could ensure
a consistent level of compliance with law and soft law by all interested actors
and stakeholders throughout the entire chain of EDTs. In this context,
independent public authorities or private bodies could contribute with regard to
standards, certification schemes, supervision and penalties.105
The issues raised by EDTs could also be tackled by empowering civil
society—an empowerment that will not be caused by market forces
spontaneously, but should be guided by scholars and activists106 and could
consists in providing users with greater awareness and tools for monitoring
online markets for consumer policy purposes.107 This assumption underlies, for
instance, the CLAUDETTE project of the European University Institute in
Florence, i.e., a machine learning powered system aimed at automatically
detecting non-compliant privacy policies and potentially unlawful clauses in
online terms of service.108
A further option could be to make mandatory for designers, developers,
owners and users of EDTs to pay a tax, fee or contribution into a fund
specifically established to ensure compensation for possible victims.109 As

102 Infantino, supra note 97, at 1800.
103 GDPR, supra note 25, art. 5(2).
104 Comandè, supra note 37, at 184–185.
105 Id. at 187.
106 Hans W. Micklitz and Przemysław Pałka, Algorithms in the Service of the Civil Society, 1 J. OF
EUROPEAN CONSUMER AND MARKET L. 1 (2019).
107 The European Commission financially supports initiatives in the area of consumer law, digital market
surveillance and consumer law enforcement in digital markets in EU Member States; see, e.g.,
Exploratory Study: Exploring IT/AI tools for monitoring online markets for consumer policy purposes,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
(Dec.
12,
2018),
JUST/2018/CONS/PR/CO01/0123,
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=639900.
108 See http://claudette.eui.eu.
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UC DAVIS L. REV. 323, 383 (2019).
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suggested at the European level for drones and AI, the compensation fund
should cover damage deriving from EDTs in relation to any inherent risk, in light
of their characteristics and potential applications, as well as cases where an
accident occurs and the responsible person is not identified or has failed to pay
the due amount to the fund.
A similar (even complementary) path has been recommended also by the
Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies of the European
Commission,112 as well as by the European Parliament with specific regard to
robots: “establishing a compulsory insurance scheme where relevant and
necessary for specific categories of robots whereby, similarly to what already
happens with cars, producers, or owners of robots would be required to take out
insurance cover for the damage potentially caused by their robots.”113 Such an
option could be extended to EDTs more generally: for instance, for autonomous
vehicles insurance could be a precondition for accessing the streets, and a “kill
switch” could automatically disable the car in the event of missing insurance.
After all, many legal systems already compel owners of vehicles to purchase
third-party insurance covering damage caused to others while circulating.
Depending on the circumstances, insurance coverage could be imposed to the
owner alone or to a pool consisting of all parties involved in the production and
distribution chain of EDTs, and the “insurance premium” would likely be built
into the EDT sale price.114 However, the introduction of a compulsory insurance
scheme raises a number of issues: for instance, how to determine when an EDT
is sophisticated enough to require coverage, to what extent to impose such an
obligation on manufacturers—if completely absolved, they would no longer be
incentivized to refine safety measures—or owners or users, how to address the
case of damage not covered by mandatory insurance policies, and so on.115
Not even the latter solution would shield the industry from the need of
reforming the current liability framework. On the contrary, liability insurers
themselves support such a review in order to reduce current unpredictability of
liability costs: ambiguity reduction and enhanced predictability would make it
easier to set premiums for the insurance industry, which, as is well known,
“embraces risk and abhors uncertainty”.116 In fact, the insurance market may
simply not offer coverage for a certain risk, if missing experience makes it
difficult to calculate it—and this could be a recurring problem with EDTs.117 At
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the same time, one should not forget those damages that can be compensated but
not fully insured, given that monetary compensation alone would not be enough
in relation to, for instance, the loss of a person's life or harm to irreplaceable
environmental goods. In such cases, tort liability plays a crucial role as a policy
instrument.118
All options mentioned in this work have limits to some extent, but this does
not imply that they cannot serve a constructive role with respect to risk and
liability distribution. Rather than looking for a one-size-fits-all solution,
European law will have to assess and reinvent its strategy, as anchored in the
checks and balances of the rule of law, without being harnessed in traditional
legal theories—that can only point the way. To capitalize on the benefits of
EDTs and prove up to the challenges raised by innovation, a multi-faceted
approach should be pursued, whereby different regulatory and policy
instruments are combined and continuously reviewed as EDTs evolve.

118 Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Assessing the Insurance Role of Tort Liability After Calabresi, 77
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 135, 162-63 (2014).

